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1. Introduction 
The production of scientific and technological innovations has become essential for many 
firms, but the latter are seldom in possession of all the knowledge needed for this activity 
because of the increasing complexity of knowledge bases or because R&D departments are 
too small. As they do not possess internally all the skills they need, firms wishing to innovate 
have recourse to external sources, such as cooperation with other firms or public 
organizations of research. However, acquiring external knowledge is not sufficient; one must 
also be able to use it in a specific process of production, to transform it into organizational 
routines, because it is important not only to integrate this knowledge, but ideally to use it to 
produce new knowledge.  
This process of creation, re-creation or imitation of new resources is a complex operation that 
not only necessitates several technical and organizational adaptations, but also requires 
frequent relations of cooperation and partnership. The integration of new knowledge cannot 
be done in one go, but progressively during the course of the innovation projects, which 
implies that relations be sustained for a period of time. But the interests of the participants to 
this interactive process, as well as their opinions concerning technical issues sometimes vary 
or diverge. This is why cooperations are also sources of tensions and conflicts that jeopardize 
the adaptation of knowledge produced somewhere else to the context of the firm or even 
completely hinder the innovation process.  
In this article, we try to provide some answers to the following question: What is the role 
played by geographical and organized proximities in the context of these external acquisitions Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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of knowledge? In other words, can they help reduce the intensity of conflicts and thus facilitate 
the interactive process of innovations?  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we present shortcomings of innovation theory 
and works on spillovers claiming the importance of geographical proximity for circulation of 
knowledge without considering organizational prerequisites to reach this impact. Having 
explained the relevance of permanent as well as temporary geographical proximity, we will 
then turn to a discussion of conflicts between cooperators within innovation processes from a 
theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. The empirical study is based on a case study of 
French biotechnology firms and will serve to prove our hypothesis that temporary geographical 
proximity play an important role in preventing and resolving conflicts between innovators.  
 
2.  The Spatial Dimension of the External Acquisition of Competencies to Innovate 
Firms, wishing to innovate, rest on a knowledge base that they possess internally and/or must 
obtain from their competitors, neighbors or partners (Cohen & Levinthal 1989). Studies on 
districts or innovating milieus (Becattini 1990, Saxenian 1994, 2000) as well as recent 
developments in the innovation theory refer to the spatial dimension in the relations of 
acquisition of external knowledge, whether they are inter-firm relations or relations with 
research laboratories. They postulate the beneficial effects of geographical proximity, which 
would seem to be due in particular, to the possibilities offered by face-to-face (F2F) relations 
between local actors, relations which facilitate the transmission of knowledge, in particular of 
tacit knowledge (Lundvall 1992).  
In light of recent research and applied studies carried out on the matter (Vedello 1997, Dahl et 
al. 2003), this thesis needs to be seriously re-evaluated. In the following paragraphs we show 
the limits of the analyses in terms of localized knowledge spillovers, before presenting recent 
breakthroughs in the field of economics of proximity, in particular concerning the possibility of 
moments of temporary proximity during the interactive process of innovation. We end this Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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section with a conclusion on the importance of relations of proximity in the process of external 
acquisitions of technology.  
 
2.1   Localized Knowledge Spillovers and Their Limits 
One of the characteristics of innovation is to produce externalities. Due to the peculiar nature 
of this activity that is sometimes compared to the production of a (semi) public good, the 
results cannot be totally appropriated by the innovator, as part of the knowledge is diffused into 
the economy without the innovator being able to prevent it, or even being aware of it. When 
innovation (or R&D) is likened to information, there is a leakage of results that concerns the 
overall economy, but the approach in terms of knowledge leads one to analyze the possibility 
of diffusing this knowledge, as well as the geographical area it covers. From an empirical point 
of view, the fact that there is a high concentration of innovative activities contradicts the 
hypothesis of a complete diffusion of R&D results, which would allow activities to be equally 
distributed throughout the territory. The polarization of innovative activities, which is even 
greater than the production activities (Audretsch & Feldman 1996), is then often accounted for 
by the characteristics of the externalities that are assumed to have a limited geographical 
extension. Autant-Bernard & Massard (1999) have compiled four types of studies dedicated to 
calculating the externalities of knowledge (or spillovers) and their spatial area, respectively 
based on: 
-  the use of patents as markers of externalities (Jaffé et al 1993), 
-  the geographical concentration of innovations (Feldman 1994, Audretsch & 
Feldman 1996), 
-  the geographical coincidence (Jaffé 1986, Anselin et al. 1997), and 
-  local interaction (Anselin et al. 1997, Wallsten 2001), 
-  to which one may add (Feldman 1999) knowledge incorporated in capital or 
investment goods. Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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All these works come to the conclusion that externalities exist and that their geographical 
extension is limited. This explains the concentration of firms in certain areas and supports the 
idea of geographical proximity being an important factor in the diffusion of knowledge. 
However, the measurement of geographical extension of localized knowledge spillovers is 
still debated. Some of the above-quoted studies do not really propose an estimation of spatial 
externalities: the authors use a predefined geographical area, which presupposes, but does not 
prove the existence of externalities. Thus, the first three methods (patents, concentration, 
coincidence) do not offer a true measurement of externalities (no calculation of the elasticity 
of R&D expenditure in relation to the innovation capacity of the company of reference) and 
even less of the distance they are supposed to cover. Assuming that externalities exist, they 
model their effects and, in actual fact, measure agglomeration phenomena. These methods 
generally postulate the role of local dimensions by using pre-defined geographical areas: 
states (Jaffé 1989, Feldman 1994), metropolitan areas (Jaffé et al. 1993) and counties (Anselin 
et al. 1997 in their first evaluation). Notions of distance, when they are introduced into the 
gravity and coverage indicators used by these authors, are pre-defined. For instance, 
according to Anselin et al (second measurement), R&D may have been carried out within a 
radius of 50 or 75 miles around the county of reference. 
More recent studies are making use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in order to 
model the range of technology spillovers provide an indication for measuring distance. Thus, 
Wallsten (2001) makes use of GIS to analyze the probability for a firm whose neighbors 
received government support for innovation, of also benefiting from such assistance. It locates 
firms without using a pre-defined geographical zone and shows that firms receiving financial 
support are situated close to each other, in a radius of one tenth of a mile, often on the 
periphery of urban areas. Even if these are strategic externalities linked to information rather 
than R&D, and although participating in a government program is liable to introduce a 
different angle, one sees nevertheless, that the distance retained, if it is not pre-defined, still Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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varies noticeably from one author to another (from 50 miles to one tenth of a mile), which 
allows extrapolation. Finally, it was not until the publication of Orlando’s work (2000) that 
distances and research externalities could be simultaneously calculated thanks to these 
methods.  
 
2.2   Geographical Proximity and Organized Proximity 
Literature on the economy of proximity generally refers to two types of proximity (Gilly & 
Torre 1999, Kirat & Lung 1999, Rallet & Torre 2000):  
-  Organized proximity lies on two types of logic, a logic of similitude and a logic of 
belonging. According to the logic of belonging, actors are close when they belong 
to the same space of relations (firm, network…), i.e. actors between whom 
interactions of different natures take place. According to the logic of similitude, 
actors are close when they are alike, i.e. when they possess the same space of 
reference and share the same knowledge, so that the institutional dimension is also 
important. 
-  Geographical proximity refers to a great extent to the location of firms, and 
integrates the social dimension of economic mechanisms, or what is sometimes 
called functional distance. In other words, the reference to natural and physical 
constraints is an important aspect of geographical proximity but other aspects are 
equally important in its definition: the aspect of social structures such as transport 
infrastructures that facilitate accessibility, or the financial mechanisms that allow 
the use of certain communication technologies. 
It is necessary to take this definition of geographical proximity further by distinguishing 
permanent geographical proximity, which corresponds to the co-localization of firms, from 
temporary geographical proximity, which lies on momentary F2F interactions enabling actors 
to meet without necessarily requiring co-localization.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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This type of proximity is related to a phenomenon that is currently spreading: the increasing 
mobility of individuals, information and goods. Indeed the professional mobility of 
individuals has increased with the development of transports (improved accessibility, increase 
of speed, reduction of costs) and the technological revolution in telecommunications 
(improved forms of long-distance processing and transfer of information in comparison with 
the telephone era, low costs of information transfer). The complementarities of transports and 
communication (the more individuals telecommute, the more they need to meet others, and 
vice versa) increase this mobility, so that an increasing number of actors no longer have a 
permanent workplace. But there are wider mobilities, which cross territories: the traveling of 
a sales representative, the visits of a consultant auditing a firm for several days, the 
participation of a researcher to a national or international congress, the temporary visit of an 
engineer to the laboratory of a firm or university with which his/her firm cooperates. Thanks 
to these developing mobilities, the constraint of geographical proximity can be fulfilled 
temporarily through traveling without the interaction leading to the permanent co-localization 
of the partners.  
The need for geographical proximity is generally not permanent. It affects certain phases of 
the interaction: the phase of negotiation in a transaction, the definition of the organizational 
framework and guidelines of cooperation, the realization of its initial phase in the case of a 
technological alliance, the necessity to share equipment in the experimental phase of a 
common research project or to exchange knowledge and above all to know personally the 
researchers (colloquium) belonging to a scientific community etc. Short or medium-term 
visits are then sufficient for the partners to exchange – during F2F meetings – the information 
needed for cooperation. As a result permanent co-localization is not necessary even for 
activities, where physical interaction plays an important role in the coordination (services co-
produced by the provider and the user, knowledge-intensive activities such as innovation and 
R&D activities). This is what we call the need for temporary geographical proximity.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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Indeed, the possibility of moments of temporary proximity puts into question one of the most 
widespread theses in the regional analysis, according to which firms have a strong tendency to 
settle near one another because of frequent and repetitive interactions requiring F2F relations. 
This idea can be found in particular in the research carried out in the field of innovation 
geography (Feldman 1999). According to some authors firms need geographical proximity to 
exchange knowledge concerning their production, commercialization, and above all R&D 
activities. The thesis is based on the tacit nature of part of the knowledge, the transmission of 
which requires F2F relations (learning by imitation, informal exchanges, intuitive solutions to 
problems etc.) whereas codified knowledge is transmitted more easily through ICT or 
physical supports (articles, books, instruction manuals etc.), which are independent from the 
individuals or organizations that produced them.  
This thesis must be relativized (Rallet & Torre 2000). The equation of the sharing of tacit 
knowledge and geographical proximity on the one hand, and codified knowledge and long-
distance relations on the other, is indeed simplistic. Firstly, it is difficult to separate the uses 
of both types of knowledge and therefore to translate them with different geographical terms. 
Secondly, F2F relations, and therefore geographical proximity, are not the only possible 
supports for the sharing of tacit knowledge (Freel 2002).  Thanks to the collective rules and 
representations that they produce, organizations offer powerful mechanisms of long-distance 
coordination (or organized proximity). Thirdly, ICT also make the long-distance sharing or 
co-producing of tacit knowledge possible thanks to the technological evolution of computer 
sciences, which offer possibilities such as informal or visual communication (association of 
the image, written support and voice) or written communication that has become close to oral 
communication (e-mails, forums, chats etc.). There is no denying that F2F relations remain 
indispensable for certain types of interactions (Dahl & Pedersen 2003), in particular to solve 
problems related to the heterogeneity of reasoning modes or those related to the processes of Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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deliberation and negotiation. However, the intensity of the need for F2F relations varies 
according to the phase of the process (Gallaud & Torre 2003). 
 
2.3   External Acquisitions of Technology and Their Spatial Dimension 
External acquisitions of knowledge have for a long time been considered as essential for a 
firm’s production of innovation, whether the knowledge is acquired through firm-to-firm 
relations or relations of an academic nature (Lundvall 1992). A firm wishing to acquire 
external knowledge can get information made public through conferences, trade fares, 
publications, symposia, exhibitions etc. but most knowledge it wishes to acquire is private (or 
semi public) and can only be acquired from other firms or organizations. These acquisitions 
range from commercial transactions (the markets of technology) to research cooperation. The 
latter can be more or less formalized, whether it concerns relations with public research 
organizations (contracts between universities and industries) or with other enterprises (vertical 
cooperation, which corresponds to relations with clients or suppliers, and horizontal 
cooperation with the competitors, the complementary firms belonging to the same sector or 
other types of enterprises). In cases where knowledge is public, geographical proximity has 
no impact because knowledge can be acquired wherever the innovating firm is located in 
relation to the productive source of knowledge. Things are different when the information is 
not divulged: it can be beneficial for the firm that seeks to acquire it to be located in the 
proximity of the productive organization. 
The needs for geographical proximity vary according to the type of cooperation undertaken by 
a firm. The latter depends mainly on the difference between the knowledge bases of the 
organizations that cooperate. The bigger the difference is between knowledge bases the more 
necessary are interactions of proximity: interactions implying temporary meetings and/or a 
localization of proximity.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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Generally, for most cooperation projects, interactions are frequent during the phase dedicated 
to the search for partners and the cooperation contract negotiations. Repeated interactions 
allow the mutual evaluation of the initial competencies and resources as well as those, which 
will have to be produced during the cooperation. Later on the frequency of interactions, 
proximity might drop for two reasons: i) the organizations know each other better and can 
therefore exchange through communication technologies, ii) the closer one gets to the 
production process, the more information organizations possess internally, which limits the 
needs for exchanges.  
The relations between external acquisitions of knowledge and forms of proximity can be 
systematically classified according to five channels generally found in literature:   
-  informal interactions 
Considered as being the basis of the daily functioning of districts and milieus 
(Becattini 1990, Camagni 1991), they, above all, enable local actors to exchange 
general information and tacit knowledge, mainly through former work colleagues or 
fellow students (Dahl & Pedersen 2003). Because this type of knowledge 
transmission is not easily carried out when the actors are geographically distant, co-
localization or permanent geographical proximity plays an important role in this 
case. As for organizing occasional meetings between geographically distant actors, 
this option would precisely be outside the informal nature of the type of interactions 
discussed here.  
-  patents and licenses   
This highly codified type of knowledge transmission does not generally imply any 
relation of geographical, nor even organized proximity, with the exception of 
licenses of know-how which imply the obligation for the firm granting the license to 
commission the installation on the site of the client firm or to train its staff. Thus 
Tyres and Von Hippel (1997) have studied the purchase by firms of new machines, Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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the installation of which necessitates on average three trips by the engineers of the 
innovating firm. The geographical proximity mobilized here, of a temporary nature, 
also proves relatively limited in time.  
-  Industry-university cooperations (Carayol 2003) concerning research operations 
Informal interactions of cooperation, often used as support to development, must be 
distinguished from formal interactions. As shown above, geographical proximity is 
important in the case of informal relations. Indeed the co-localization of 
organizations facilitates exchanges of information concerning the techniques and 
competencies available (know-who). In its permanent form, it also plays an 
important role in situations where a firm makes use of university buildings and 
when material and equipment are used in common by the university and the firm. 
In the case of projects of formal cooperations, interactions occur during the stage of 
(fundamental or applied) research. The need for geographical proximity is then only 
temporary, as these interactions occur less frequently than informal interactions. 
However, the bigger the difference between the knowledge bases of the 
organizations and the more frequent and necessary interactions of proximity will be.  
-  formal interaction in the form of vertical cooperations   
Cooperations within a supply chain help define the characteristics of the innovations 
and therefore reduce the risk associated with the introduction of new products or 
processes of production on the market (Tether 2002). Cooperations with clients, 
which concern above all the stages of applied R&D, make it possible to reinforce 
the adequacy between product and demand (Lundvall 1992). Defined as the lead 
user, a client will help – as early as the design stage – an innovating firm to adapt its 
innovation to the needs of the market. Interactions of proximity play an essential 
role in this case: interactions are frequent during the stage of research but their 
frequency progressively drops during the different stages of development. Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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Cooperations with suppliers are of two types. It is important to distinguish the 
suppliers who participate to the production of the innovation from those who only 
intervene at the industrial stage (at the time of mass production):  
  Suppliers who belong to the first category will have to adapt their 
products to the demand of the innovating firm. Interactions of proximity 
will therefore take place at all stages of the process, according to the 
modifications of the innovation project. In this case only temporary 
geographical proximity is necessary for the good progress of these 
operations.  
  The suppliers of the second category only need to modify their products 
once the R&D process is over. The interactions – less frequent than in 
the previous case – occur at the stage of mass production. Here again, 
only moments of temporary proximity are necessary.  
-  formal interactions in the form of horizontal cooperations 
Three cases must be distinguished:  
  ‘classic’ horizontal cooperations, i.e. with firms belonging to other 
sectors of production, generally concern specific moments of the 
research project. Permanent or temporary, geographical proximity is 
used to solve development problems. 
  Cooperations with competitors are regulated in order to avoid the 
collusion of products on the market and the formation of oligopolies. 
This is why cooperation is often limited to the research stage. However, 
firms try to limit the leakage of their know-how in these exchanges. 
Indeed, Dahl & Pedersen (2003) show that in some clusters the work 
contracts of engineers contain a clause of non-disclosure of the 
information related to R&D projects to engineers of rival firms, which Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
  12
limits informal interactions. Firms are in this case confronted to a 
contradiction: they can choose co-localization in the hope of benefiting 
from their neighbors’ knowledge while trying to limit the leakage of 
information concerning their own productions. This illustrates quite well 
the ambiguous nature of permanent geographical proximity. It is simpler 
to set up occasional meetings in the context of cooperation contracts 
during the stages of research, meetings that both limit the risks and 
opportunities of obtaining external knowledge. 
  Cooperations with firms of the same sector with complementary 
activities also occur during the stage of research but can go as far as the 
setting up of prototypes. Because the division of labor is high, 
interactions of proximity occur less frequently than in the case of 
academic cooperation, firms trying to limit interactions to the stage 
when the ‘modules’ of the innovation are assembled. 
 
Thus, the need for geographical proximity remains relatively important in the processes of 
external acquisitions of knowledge, even though temporary geographical proximity is generally 
needed more than permanent proximity, and therefore the co-localization of activities of 
innovation seldom seems essential. This result contrasts with theses of innovation theories, 
which tend to overestimate the role of geographical proximity and to advocate the co-
localization of firms or research laboratories. Contrary to these predictions, external 
acquisitions do not generally occur in the context of permanent geographical proximity but of 
temporary proximity, and mainly between distant organizations, which are not situated in the 
same geographical area. The division of labor enables innovators to individually carry out the 
stage of production for which they possess the most competencies and to limit interactions with 
other parties to the stage of assembling of the innovation. However, the density of interactions Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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strongly depends on the respective competencies of the firms engaged in the innovation 
process, while all innovations do not require the same density of proximity interactions nor 
their concentration at the same moment of the process.  
 
3.   The Introduction of the Conflictual Dimension 
Innovation theories and the works on spillovers claim that permanent geographical proximity 
has beneficial effects on the development of innovation at local level, because it allows a high 
and regular frequency of interactions. But this idea is currently disputed. The first reason for 
this refers, as mentioned above, to the important role of temporary geographical proximity in 
the process of innovation. Secondly, it has also to be considered that permanent geographical 
proximity produces negative effects seldom discussed in literature. In particular it is the source 
of conflicts of access to scarce resources (increase of the prices of plots, access to qualified 
labor) and conflicts of interests between co-localized actors (Saxenian 1994).  
However, conflicts occurring during the interactive process of production of innovation do not 
only concern the disadvantages of geographical proximity. They are more related to the 
tensions that emerge between actors, as technical differences, interpersonal disagreements, 
issues of power, property rights etc. We shall see below, based on the example of French 
biotechnology firms, that geographical proximity plays a complex role in attempts to solve 
conflicts. Permanent proximity enables neighboring actors to meet and have informal relations. 
Temporary proximity has an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
emerging during the process of production of innovations, whether they are conflicts related to 
the organization of labor, to technical characteristics of the innovation or to property rights.  
 
3.1   Economic Analyses of Conflicts 
Economic analysis has dedicated little time to the study of conflictual relations because this 
notion poses methodological problems, which often prove in contradiction with the core of Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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theoretical elaborations. The field of analysis is generally confined to conflicts of interests or 
conflicts related to the distribution of wealth between actors, which excludes conflicts of 
passion (which are a matter for psychology) as well as the relations of power (reserved to 
political sciences). 
Thus the classics have privileged the conflicts related to the distribution of wealth, thinking 
that strong inequalities led to recurring revolts (and therefore to open conflicts), while the neo-
classics have focused more on the problems of conflicts of interests, proposing to solve them 
by designing instruments that would enable actors to represent the gains of exchange. Later on, 
Game Theory considered conflicts as a central object of analysis, its research focusing on the 
determination of possible solutions and resolutions depending on whether they are cooperative 
or non-cooperative games (Schmidt 2001). However, in these works, conflicts never reach the 
stage of commitment behavior (verbal or physical aggression) and do not even lead – in the 
non-cooperative approaches – to any communication between the actors who agree on the set 
of solutions, represented by artifacts such as the matrix of gains. Even credible threats do not 
go beyond ‘polite declarations’ calling for ‘rational’ reactions from the opponent, and never 
degenerate into acts of violence.  
Most heterodox approaches adhere to this idea of relations without serious conflicts (i.e. not 
leading to acts of violence) and try above all to highlight the mechanisms of conflict 
prevention, just like the School of Regulation, which emphasizes the notion of compromise 
enabling the different institutional forms to build up a system (for instance the Fordist 
compromise). The evolutionist approach prefers to analyze routines – defined as control 
mechanisms that are sufficient to prevent conflicts, and resulting from an organizational truce 
between managers and employees (Nelson & Winter 1982) – rather than explain how the 
conflict is resolved. It does not deny that intra-organizational conflicts do exist – ‘it is not 
however of our intention to ignore the divergence of interests between organization members’ 
(idem, p. 107) – and that actors can resist from automatically carrying out the task prescribed Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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by the firm. On the contrary, it emphasizes that employees work in the framework of ‘defacto 
contracts’, which imply a certain propensity to not carry out their tasks being controlled by 
the managing staff. In itself this routine activity dissuades actors from pursuing their personal 
interests and keeps conflicts within limits that are bearable for firms.  
Thus the economic management of conflicts concentrates generally on the search for 
mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution and neglects the relations of power between 
actors as well as the conflicts concerning access to scarce resources. Only the Marxist Theory 
has considered conflicts as the driving force behind economic and social change, with the 
class struggle being a form of open and violent conflict between members of different social 
groups, aiming to modify the distribution of wealth. The main difficulty currently consists in 
producing a theory of conflict that would make it possible to take into account the 
heterogeneity of actors and the fact that the latter interact in order to find solutions to 
conflicts.  
Cyert & March (1963) were among the first authors to re-introduce the notion of conflict in 
the analysis of the firm, by studying conflicts between shareholders and managers, i.e. 
between the owners of the firm and those who exercise their decision-making powers daily 
and whose strategies are liable to affect the distribution of the value added. Other works on 
management then focused on taking into account intra-organizational conflicts and something 
close to the common definition: interpersonal disagreements.  
A conflict is defined as a process in which one of the parties in presence feels that its interests 
are opposed or negatively affected by the action of another party (Wall et al. 1995), a process, 
which goes on in time and can lead to the escalation or the reduction of tensions. But authors 
diverge on the identification of the very objects of a conflict, whether they are goals, values, 
access to resources (Putnam & Poole 1987), needs, interests (Donohue & Kolt 1992), or 
aspirations (Pruitt & Rubin 1986). The causes of conflicts found in literature also vary and 
refer to individual characteristics of the different parties, difficulties or type of communication, Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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power-seeking behavior (Blalock 1989, Ferguson & Cooper 1987), self-fulfilling prophecies 
concerning the reactions of other actors in relations to one’s own objectives, structure of 
organizations or earlier interactions, as a previous conflict is likely to re-occur, especially if it 
has left one party unsatisfied (Tjosvold & Chia 1989). 
Nowadays, the temptation to limit conflicts is being replaced by attempts of valorization (in 
particular in the case of innovation projects) in order to increase the performances of the 
participants. Three main modes of conflict resolution have been observed (Wall et al 1995): i) 
in some cases solutions are found by the actors themselves – possibly because the conflict has 
become too expensive – with solutions ranging from compromise to the imposition of a point 
of view by one of the parties, including assertion through force, ii) in other situations the 
hierarchy imposes a solution, iii) in others a third party intervenes (mediation or arbitration): 
some parties may hope that their gains will be higher, if they use arbitration rather than 
compromise with other parties. Finally the managers might decide to wait for the conflict to 
solve itself. This is the so-called solution of avoidance (Gobeli et al 1998). Innovation 
situations, in particular when there is constructive interaction, facilitate the emergence of 
conflicts, the participants to one same project often having partially divergent interests or 
objectives that generate tensions during the process of innovation.  
 
3.2  Conflicts in the Process of Acquiring Knowledge and Types of Proximity 
One of the central limits of economic theory is that it ignores the conflicts related to the 
process of production (and even more of innovation). But these conflicts sometimes cause the 
failure of innovation projects, in particular when they are carried out in cooperation. 
Oppositions concerning property rights for example are an important cause of failure of 
technical cooperations. The mobilization of geographical and organizational proximities is an 
asset in the resolution of these conflicts.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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When organizations exchanging knowledge are localized in the same area, interactions can be 
repeated. But when they are not, interactions are less frequent because of costs related to 
traveling, which can be divided into transport costs and the time necessary to meet the other 
innovators. This is why the participants to a project will then try and limit the moments of 
geographical proximity, by attempting to rationalize the need for temporary geographical 
proximity making F2F interactions only possible when they are necessary. Indeed, it is 
important to make the distinction between:  
-  firms entering a sector (start-ups), who must simultaneously decide where to 
locate themselves and possibly choose cooperation partners. They might find it in 
their interest to locate in the proximity of other firms or organizations in order to 
take advantage of a pool of qualified labor or knowledge externalities within a 
single region. This case is limited – with the annual entry rate into branches being 
low – and also refers to the setting up of new production or R&D units. 
-  firms, already localized, wanting to cooperate with other organizations in order to 
innovate. These firms will not decide to re-locate in the proximity of organizations 
with which they wish to cooperate due to the cost of such an operation. This is the 
reason why surveys such as CIS (Freel 2002) find an important part of the relations 
of cooperation occurring between firms belonging to different regions or even 
different countries. The creation of a joint venture, consisting in building a new 
laboratory in a location approved by all participants, is not the most used solution 
because it is also deemed too expensive.  
For these reasons, the process of innovation in the case of external acquisition of knowledge 
often proves different from what is predicted by Innovation Theory presenting the density of 
interactions and their regularity during the process as factors to explain performance of 
innovation projects. Indeed studies show that participants in a project of innovation tend to 
meet only once a term, and the frequency of these meetings is generally stipulated in contracts 
(Gallaud 2003). The division of labor between innovating firms remains high, i.e. each firm 
carries out the tasks for which it has the most competencies and the innovators meet Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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essentially in order to assemble the different modules and/or to manage conflicts. Thus 
permanent geographical proximity is not necessarily beneficial to firms when it is associated 
with the idea of co-localization. Furthermore, a firm deprives itself of its competencies, 
sometimes for long periods of time, when it sends staff away. Temporary geographical 
proximity makes it possible to avoid this expensive solution when firms have the capacities to 
develop an innovation in common although they are not co-localized. They develop the 
project by only moving some staff, mostly in the context of a formal cooperation like a 
contract.  
The analysis of benefits of (temporary or permanent) geographical proximity in the case of 
conflicts can be listed according to the modes of resolution of conflicts emerging during the 
development of innovation projects. They are first of all (Dyer & Song 1995, Gobeli et al 
1998):  
-  avoidance, in which the project manager waits for the conflict to solve itself, at the 
risk of causing the project to fail leading to separation. If innovators do not 
recognize the conflicts, they will not travel to resolve it. 
-  the imposed solution, associated to a relatively low geographical proximity. It is not 
necessary for all the participants to the project to meet when this solution is chosen. 
Two cooperative solutions necessitate geographical proximity more because they require the 
participants meeting in order to negotiate a compromise: 
-  the  ‘give and take’ solution, whereby the hierarchy proposes a solution that is 
acceptable for all participants concerned. It differs from mediation – which refers to 
disagreements between an institution and a user more than to firms – in that one of 
the parties (the hierarchy) is both judge and party and proposes concessions 
elaborated with the workers. Co-localization facilitates the finding and acceptance 
of this type of solution. Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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-  the concerted solution, in which all participants meet and find, together, a mode of 
resolution specific to their problems. The advantages of permanent geographical 
proximity are obvious here, as it enables the parties involved to hold repeated 
deliberations and negotiations and facilitates the quick mobilization of actors after 
latency periods. We shall see below that temporary geographical proximity also has 
merits.  
But geographical proximity alone is not sufficient to solve conflicts: it is always associated to 
organized proximity. The relative failure of Japanese transplants into Silicon Valley shows that 
interactions are not generated by co-localization alone, but that institutional mechanisms are 
necessary (integrating a network by being introduced by an actor who already belongs to it). In 
other words, geographical proximity must be activated by organized proximity (Filippi & Torre 
2003). The studies carried out on ‘epistemic’ communities (Steimueller 2000) also reveal the 
importance of standards, rules and a common culture, which enables actors to interact. These 
factors correspond to what we understand by organized proximity, defined by a certain degree 
of likeness between actors (see section 2).  
While standard theories highlight the mechanisms of conflict resolution by making the 
hypothesis that actors agree on the set of solutions, the treatment of conflicts in innovation 
projects consists for the actors in building a common space, which contains the (temporary or 
definitive) solution to the conflict as well as the common rules, which will enable them to 
debate and possibly reach a compromise. The practical cases of innovation projects show that 
the innovators solve conflicts of representation when they have built a common language 
(Latour 1989, D’Adderio 2001), or forms of organized proximity, i.e. when they are 
sufficiently similar to understand a problem in the same terms. From our point of view the role 
of organized proximity varies according to the forms of conflict resolution chosen: it is nil 
when the solution of avoidance is used, low when the solution is imposed, and it increases 
significantly when the ‘give and take’ and concerted solutions are mobilized. Temporary Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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geographical proximity and organized proximity are then complementary and enable the actors 
to find processes of negotiation and compromise.  
 
3.3  Conflicts and Proximity in the Biotechnology Sector 
Far from being a homogeneous and coherent sector (Porter 1990), biotechnology can be 
defined as the  set of techniques and knowledge related to the use of living organisms in 
processes of industrial production (Ducos & Joly 1988). Biotechnology is essentially used in 
chemistry, agro-chemistry, pharmaceutical and agro-food industries, and very occasionally 
lead to a few applications related to the environment or the control of pollution. In France, a 
production chain made of firms, which are specialized in these activities or complementary 
activities, is emerging: manufacturing of specific instruments and equipment, technical 
consulting and expertise, and specific modes of financing (Lhuillery 2002).  
Biotechnology is characterized, generally and more specifically in France, by cooperations 
between distant firms, to such an extent that firms being co-localized in scientific parks do not 
appear much to cooperate locally. Distance does not seem to penalize these firms and does not 
stop them from developing their projects. But this does not mean that geographical proximity 
plays no role in their functioning. Indeed, although co-localization is not sought for, the 
benefits of geographical proximity are mobilized, but in a temporary manner through 
occasional meetings between the participants of the projects. Thus, most contracts of 
cooperation concerning innovation activities make provision for at least one meeting per term 
in order to examine the progression of the project. One of the objectives of these meetings is to 
defuse, reduce or attempt to find solutions to conflicts that may emerge during the process of 
innovation.   
  Conflicts in biotechnology are related to property rights, to the technical content of the 
cooperation (disagreements concerning the objectives and /or the technical characteristics of 
the projects), or to the organization of labor and interpersonal disagreements. Problems related Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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to property rights are likely to increase in the coming years because approximately 50 per cent 
of the patents covering the main medicines will have become public by the year 2005 (Depret 
& Hamdouch 2001), which is going to increase the competition between firms and probably 
the cooperation between big laboratories and start ups of biotechnology. Problems concerning 
conflicts of representation are important because cooperation takes place between different 
organizations, for example firms and universities. Interpersonal disagreements influence the 
performances of innovation projects (Souder 1987), even if arrangements are often possible. 
Thus, in cooperations with public organizations or universities, innovators emphasize the fact 
that they knew the researchers with whom they now cooperate before the cooperation project 
was launched. Interpersonal networks serve in this cases to reduce conflicts (Depret & 
Hamdouch 2000).  
In the following, we refer to a questionnaire survey of 60 biotech SME of (Gallaud 2003), 
where people in charge of innovation projects have been interviewed. The innovation projects 
had to have been carried out in cooperation with other firms and/or public organizations of 
research. The content of the cooperation covered all forms of technical cooperation with the 
exception of purchases of patents and licenses. The geographic area covered by the survey 
included the regions of Alsace, Auvergne, Brittany, Ile de France, Rhône Alpes and Midi 
Pyrénées. Firms localized in tscience parks as well as outside any specific group were 
included. The firms surveyed privilege activities related to agriculture and the agro-food 
industry. The objective of the interviews was to look for the role played by relations of 
proximity in the modalities of anticipation and resolution of conflicts emerging during 
processes of interaction for the external acquisition of knowledge. One of the main questions 
referred to different types of conflicts experienced and whether they had been solved through 
geographical proximity (with at least one trip of the innovators) or only by using different 
channels of tele-communication. The central hypothesis was that the different types of conflicts 
led the firms to mobilize temporary proximity with different intensities.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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The results show that the types of conflicts during innovation projects in biotechnology were 
related to:  
-  property rights of the innovation and gains drawn from future innovation. These 
conflicts occur more often in cases of cooperation than for any other form of 
acquisition because the knowledge does not yet exist when the contracts are signed 
(incomplete due to the uncertainty of the innovation process, see the chapter by 
Blum & Müller). They oppose firms and public organizations of research more 
frequently; possibly because the modes of valorization of knowledge are different 
and French public organizations were only authorized in 1999 to create private 
valorization structure. Firms with experiences on conflicts of this type have a 
higher-than-average propensity to experience once again a conflictual relation, 
possibly due to a climate of distrust between participants. Temporary geographical 
proximity is mobilized to resolve these conflicts, the innovators travelling 
(generally between 4 and 5 times) in order to solve conflicts related to the 
distribution of gains of the innovation. The relations of power and the threats will be 
more effective and credible than in the case of utilizing telecommunications. 
-  the objectives and/or technical characteristics of the innovation. If innovators do 
neither share the same knowledge nor the same ‘professional culture’, they have 
different representations of the objectives or/and the technical characteristics of the 
innovation (Latour 1989). It is this type of conflict inherent to any innovation 
project, which geographical proximity solves the most. It is easier for innovators to 
reach an agreement on the technical characteristics through F2F interactions than 
through distant interactions (e-mail or telephone), probably due to problems of 
translation between the different professional cultures. 
-  the organization of labor during the project. Conflicts of this type do not occur 
frequently. Temporary geographical proximity (i.e. travelling) is seldom used with Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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most conflicts being managed through telecommunications. This might be due to 
the fact that the organization of labor in innovation projects remains highly divided.  
-  interpersonal disagreements between innovators. These conflicts seem to be the 
most frequently solved through telecommunication, but the results of our survey do 
not enable us to draw any clear conclusion in this regard.  
Thus, whereas conflicts of access to scarce resources are partly caused by permanent 
geographical proximity, it is the content and the progress of the interactions themselves, which 
lead to conflicts during the process of innovation. Temporary geographical proximity can help 
solve these conflicts, through occasional meetings, facilitating discussions, negotiations and the 
elaboration of compromise.  
Biotechnology firms use most modes of external acquisition of knowledge and above all 
cooperation with other firms. Most cooperation takes place between distant firms. In this case 
geographical proximity is temporary (one meeting per term on average). It is often mobilized 
before the projects are launched in order to solve conflicts related to property rights. On the 
other hand its role appears more limited during the project. Above all, organized proximity 
makes it possible to limit the conflicts related to the organization of labor and differences of 
representations on the characteristics of the innovation. However it is more limited than what 
literature predicts with the division of labor remaining high in cooperation projects.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Contemporary theories of innovation overestimate the positive effects of permanent 
geographical proximity by considering the co-localization of organizations as a key factor of 
the success of interactive processes of innovation. This article aims to examine the role played 
by geographical proximity in the circulation of knowledge, by focusing on those moments of 
the process, which more particularly imply its mobilization. Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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An examination of cooperation relations reveals that the firms involved in this type of project 
use permanent geographical proximity only moderately This does not mean that geographical 
proximity plays no role in the external acquisition of knowledge, as the example of French 
biotechnology firms shows. Indeed, our research shows that French biotechnology firms 
mobilize temporary geographical proximity in order to acquire external knowledge with the 
help of cooperative projects.  Moreover, although most cooperation takes place between 
geographically distant organizations, temporary geographical proximity is often used before 
the beginning of the project to anticipate conflicts related to property rights. It has a more 
sporadic role during the course of the project, because meetings are planned from the 
beginning of the operations. However, it plays a role in the resolution of conflicts, by enabling 
the participants to meet occasionally, and discuss, negotiate and elaborate compromise to 
solve conflicts related to the organization of labor, technical characteristics of innovation and 
property rights.  Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge 
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